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DIssOcIATIoN FROM ALABAMA LIMITED LIABILITY




The rise of the domestic limited liability company (LLC), the
newest and fastest growing business form, occurred because it
represented the first domestic business entity offering the corpo-
rate characteristic of limited liability combined with the favor-
able tax treatment afforded partnerships.' Only after the Inter-
* B.A., Auburn University, 1981; J.D., The University of Alabama, December,
1996. This Article grew out of an independent study project Ms. Farrar completed
for Professor Hamill during her third year of law school. Ms. Farrar is a member of
the class of 1996-97.
** Associate Professor of Law, The University of Alabama. Professor Hamill
thanks Dean Kenneth C. Randall and her faculty colleagues for all their support and
gratefully acknowledges The University of Alabama Law School Foundation, the Ed-
ward Brett Randolph Fund and the William H. Sadler Fund. Professor Hamill spe-
cially recognizes the students in the Fall 1996 and Fall 1997 course on LLCs and
LLPs, especially Carol Longshore, Mike Perrett, Fallany Stover, James Coomes and
Wade Hartley, whose valuable classroom participation and outside research contribut-
ed greatly toward the understanding of the issues discussed in this Article.
1. See LARRY E. RmSTEiN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 1.03 (1996) (an excellent, exhaustive and extremely
useful treatise and practitioners' manual). The articles written on LLCs are too nu-
merous to cite completely. For some early articles exploring the ramification of the
recently created LLC before it became apparent that the LLC would be an impor-
tant business form, see Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Pos-
sible Choice for Doing Business?, 41 U. FLA. L. REV. 721 (1989) (early article, writ-
ten shortly after the Internal Revenue Service recognized the LLC's ability to be
taxed as a partnership, when only Wyoming and Florida had passed LLC legislation,
predicts growth in the LLCs popularity in the future); Robert R. Keatinge et al., The
Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAW. 375
(1992) (article written when only eight states had passed LLC legislation, predicting
that all 50 states would pass statutes and discussing extensively the early tax and
business issues that confronted LLCs). See also William J. Carney, Close Corpora-
tions and the Wyoming Business Corporation Act: Time For a Change? 12 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 537, 581-82 (1977) (noting right after Wyoming passed the first LLC
statutes, but long before the IRS allowed partnership taxation, that the LLC was
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nal Revenue Service recognized the LLC's ability to meet the
requirements under the partnership classification regulations
did the states adopt LLC legislation.2 In 1993 Alabama enacted
an LLC statute.' In order to ensure that Alabama LLCs met the
then-existing requirements to be taxed as a partnership,4 the
probably a poor substitute for a close corporation under most circumstances). By the
mid 1990s the literature exploring LLCs and a related business entity, the limited
liability partnership (LLP), which essentially operates as a general partnership while
offering general partners limited liability, exploded. For example, in 1995 four law
reviews dedicated entire issues to LLCs and LLPs. See 73 WASH. U. L. Q.; 66 U.
CoLO. L. REv.; 25 STETSON L. REv.; 51 Bus. LAW. As recent as the spring of 1997,
three law reviews including the inaugural issue of THE JOURNAL OF SMALL AND
EMERGING BUSINESS LAw, dedicated entire issues to LLCs and LLPs. See 32 of the
WAKE FOREST L. REV.; 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV.; 1 THE JOURNAL OF SMALL AND
EMERGING BUSINESS LAw. The differences between LLCs and LLPs and what busi-
ness lawyers should consider when choosing between the two is beyond the scope of
this Article and will be explored in a follow-up piece.
2. See Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst Exposing
the Corporate Integration Question, 95 MicH. L. REv. 393 (1996) (documenting the
rise of the limited liability company through state enactments and individual busi-
ness filings; discussing the response of the Internal Revenue Service, other branches
of government and the practicing bar; and concluding that the creation and prolifera-
tion of LLCs was completely tax driven). For an exhaustive discussion of the details
on how the partnership tax rules work, see WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL
TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1997).
3. ALjA CODE §§ 10-12-1 to -61 (1994). On May 17, 1993, the Alabama LLC
Act passed bath the Senate and the House. See 1993 H.J. Ala. Reg. Sess. 4141-42;
1993 S.J. Ala. Reg. Sess. 2845-46. Governor Jim Folsom signed the legislation on
May 20, 1993, with an effective date of October 1, 1993. 1993 Ala. Acts 1425, 1460.
For an excellent discussion of all the provisions in the Alabama LLC Act, see
Bradley J. Sklar & W. Todd Carlisle, The Alabama Limited Liability Company Act,
45 AiA. L. REV. 145 (1993). The language in Alabama's statute came from previously
enacted LLC statutes in other states, portions of the Alabama Business Corporation
and Partnership Acts, the Prototype LLC Act (finished in 1992 by members of the
ABA's subcommittee on LLCs to aid state drafters) and the then-current draft of the
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (the drafting process started in August of
1992 and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)
adopted the Uniform Act in August of 1994, with amendments issued in 1995 and
1996). See commentary to all provisions of the Alabama LLC Act . See also Mitchel
Hampton Boles & Susan Pace Hamill, Agency Powers and Fiduciary Duties Under
the Alabama Limited Liability Company Act: Suggestions for Future Reform, 48 ALA.
L. REV. 143 (1996) (discussing extensively the agency powers and fiduciary duties of
LLC members as compared to similar rights and duties of general partners, limited
partners, and corporate shareholders).
4. Until recently, unincorporated organizations seeking partnership taxation had
to defeat two out of four corporate characteristics--continuity of life, centralized
management, free transferability of interests and limited liability-set out in detail
in the partnership classification regulations finalized in 1960 in response to United
States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954); infra note 8 and accompanying text
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statutory default provisions vested agency powers and manage-
ment rights in all members, restricted the ability of all members
to transfer their interest in the LLC and required the LLC to
dissolve upon the death, retirement, withdrawal, bankruptcy or
incompetence of any member unless all remaining members
agreed to continue the business.5 The need to trigger a possible
dissolution every time a member withdrew from or otherwise be-
came separated from the business, known as dissociation under
partnership and many LLC statutes,6 created a highly unstable
discussing the recent regulations granting domestic unincorporated business organiza-
tions automatic partnership taxation. See Treas. Reg. § 301. 7701-2 (as amended in
1993); Susan Pace Hamill, The Taxation of Domestic Limited Liability Companies
and Limited Partnerships: A Case for Eliminating the Partnership Classification Reg-
ulations, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 565, 566-68 (1995) (describing in detail the historical
evolution of the partnership classification regulations; documenting extensively part-
nership classification private letter rulings issued to limited partnerships and limited
liability companies; and concluding that the partnership classification regulations
serve no purpose other than to increase transaction costs). See also Patrick E.
Hobbs, Entity Classification: The One Hundred-Year Debate, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 437
(1995) (discussing the evolution of the criteria for corporation tax classification).
5. See ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-21, -22, -30, -32, -33, -36, and -37 (1994) (ensuring
that all Alabama LLCs that form under the Alabama LLC statute without making
substantive changes in the operating agreement lack centralized management, free
transferability of interests and continuity of life). See also Rev. Rul. 94-6, 1994-1
C.B. 314 (recognizing that Alabama LLCs operating under the default provisions
meet the Internal Revenue Service's partnership classification regulations). For expla-
nations of Alabama LLC provisions within the primary context of a comprehensive
and excellent treatise on Alabama corporate law, see RICHARD THIGPEN, ALA. CORP.
LAw WITH FORMS, §§ 1-16 to -18 (1995).
On September 15, 1997, the Alabama Legislature amended the Alabama Limit-
ed Liability Company Act. Act of Sept. 23, 1997, No. 97-920, 1997 Ala. Advance
Legis. Serv. 677. The amendments became effective on January 1, 1998. Id. The
amendment changed the following sections of the Alabama Code of 1975: 10-12-2; 10-
12-4; 10-12-5; 10-12-8; 10-12-9; 10-12-10; 10-12-12; 10-12-13; 10-12-14; 10-12-15; 10-
12-16; 10-12-21; 10-12-22; 10-12-24; 10-12-29; 10-12-30; 10-12-34; 10-12-35; 10-12-36;
10-12-37; 10-1245; 10-12-47; 10-12-51; and 10-12-55. Id.
6. REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACr § 601 (1994) (hereinafter RUPA); UNIF.
LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 601 (1994) (hereinafter ULLCA), reprinted in J. DENNIS HYNES
AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND THE LLC: SELECTED STATUTES AND FORM AGREEMENT
(1997). Under the RUPA and the ULLCA, dissociation refers to all situations where
the partner or LLC member is no longer associated with the business. See RUPA
§ 601; ULLCA § 601. Clearly, dissociation occurs when a partner or member volun-
tarily withdraws or retires from the business. See RUPA § 601(1); ULLCA § 601(1).
However, other involuntary situations such as death, bankruptcy, incapacity or ex-
pulsion also result in dissociation from the business. See RUPA § 601(4)-(5); ULLCA
§ 601(5)-(8). Depending on the circumstances, dissociations may or may not result in
an actual dissolution. See infra notes 40-52 and accompanying text (discussing when
dissolution or buyouts occur). Because the Uniform Partnership Act requires the
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business environment. The LLC's dissolvability created the po-
tential for individual members to abusively withdraw from the
business.7
On December 18, 1996, the Internal Revenue Service issued
the long-awaited final regulations, known as the check-the-box
regulations, automatically taxing domestic LLCs and many other
unincorporated entities as partnerships.' For the first time in
the history of tax classification of unincorporated business orga-
nizations, partnership taxation can be achieved without regard
to the business characteristics of the entity. The state legisla-
tures are free to craft the LLC's provisions governing dissocia-
tion and dissolution in order to promote the best business policy.
This could entail eliminating all dissolution triggers9 and also
could go as far as eliminating all dissociation rights, which
would essentially render LLC members similar to shareholders
of closely held corporations with no individual rights to with-
draw from and be bought out by the company. 10
Primarily in response to the check-the-box regulations, on
September 23, 1997, Governor Fob James signed new legislation
amending Alabama's LLC statute." This legislation eliminates
partnership to dissolve upon all separations from the business, the term dissociation
does not appear in that statute. See RUPA § 601, cmt.
7. See infra note 27 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 53-56 and
accompanying text (discussing wrongful dissolution under RUPA).
8. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301. 7701-1 to -4, 61 Fed. Reg. 66584 (1996). The final
regulations treat domestic unincorporated business organizations as partnerships by
default. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(bXl). In other words, unincorporated business
firms must affirmatively elect to be taxed as corporations. Although most unincorpo-
rated business firms will prefer partnership taxation, thus making any affirmative
election unnecessary, these regulations acquired the label "check-the-box" during their
development. See also Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -4, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,989
(1996) and I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-1 C.B. 297 (Internal Revenue Service's develop-
ment leading up to the final regulations); Hamill, supra note 4; and Daniel Shefter,
Check the Box Partnership Classification: A Legitimate Exercise in Tax Simplification,
67 TAX NOTES 279 (1995) (supporting the regulations before they were finalized);
Susan Kalinka, The Louisiana Limited Liability Company Law After "Check-the-Box,"
57 LA. L. REv. 715 (1997).
9. The tax necessity of triggering a possible dissolution of the firm when a
member dissociates created negative business consequences. See Sklar & Carlisle,
supra note 3, at 217-18.
10. See F. HODGE ONEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, Q'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORA-
TIONS § 7.03 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter CLOSE CORPORATIONS].
11. Act of Sept. 23, 1997, No. 97-920, 1997 Ala. Advance Legis. Serv., 1st Spec.
Sess., 677, 723. The newly enacted provisions can be found at ALA. CODE § 10-12-8
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all possibilities of dissolution and dissociation due to a member's
withdrawal or other separation from the LLC. Consequently,
Alabama LLC members no longer individually possess statutory
rights to dissolve the company or withdraw their capital and
have their interest purchased by the company. The new Ala-
bama LLC legislation became effective on January 1, 1998.12
Part II of this Article explores the statutory provisions and
legal precedents defining the rights of partners and corporate
shareholders to recoup their investments through either a com-
plete dissolution of the entity or a buy out of the particular own-
ership interest, emphasizing the evolutionary changes occurring
over time. 3 Using a continuum model to outline the possible
approaches at either extreme, at one end the Uniform Partner-
ship Act allowed partners the absolute right to dissolve the part-
nership and withdraw their capital, while at the other end, tra-
ditional corporate law provided no rights of shareholders to sell
their shares back to the corporation whose continued existence
remains unaffected by the departure of shareholders.
This Part then explores the dissociation and dissolution
rights of general partners and shareholders falling in between
these two extremes on the continuum. In 1994, the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act, approved by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, substantially revised
portions of the Uniform Partnership Act, including the dissolu-
tion provisions, rendering general partnerships far less suscepti-
ble to actual dissolutions.14 Moreover, the corporate statutes
and legal precedents developed a set of judicial and statutory
exceptions to the traditional corporate law, allowing minority
shareholders of closely held corporations to force a buy back of
their shares, dissolve the corporation or otherwise receive dam-
ages when majority shareholders breach fiduciary duties or
behave oppressively. 5 Finally, Part II concludes that the provi-
sions of Alabama's LLC amendments eliminating all statutory
dissolution triggers represent a positive improvement to the LLC
et seq. (1994).
12. Act of Sept. 23, 1997, No. 97-920, § 3, 1997 Ala. Advance Legis. Serv., 1st
Sp. Sess., 677, 723.
13. See infra Part Hl.
14. RUPA §§ 601-603, 701, 801.
15. See infra Part H(C).
1998] 913
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law because no valid policy justification exists to retain dissolu-
tion powers in LLCs due to the limited liability protection.16
Part III first presents the pure business arguments for and
against retaining provisions in the LLC statute providing mem-
bers the right to withdraw or otherwise dissociate from the LLC,
requiring the LLC to redeem the member's interest." Many
practitioners argue that dissociation rights in the partnership
and LLC statutes should be totally eliminated because these
rights increase transaction costs. 8 Faced with default provi-
sions allowing partners and LLC members to withdraw their
capital, attorneys are often asked by their business clients, who
by definition are sophisticated enough to secure competent legal
advice before proceeding, to restrict or eliminate these rights in
a tailored operating agreement. 9
Despite a possible increase in transaction costs for some
business owners, Part III argues that the LLC statute should
retain rights of members to dissociate and be redeemed by the
company. Statutory default provisions for LLCs, as well as other
business forms historically used by small business, should be
written for the unsophisticated business participants who will
rarely seek adequate legal advice in advance. Because unsophis-
ticated members of LLCs more closely resemble simple general
partners, dissociation provisions are needed to protect them from
the oppression situations that have plagued close corporation
shareholders. Moreover, the legal authorities addressing the
oppression of minority shareholders in close corporations suggest
that the presence of dissociation rights, effectively evening out
the bargaining power between the minority and majority own-
ers, help small business owners more easily settle their differ-
ences without resorting to litigation. Also, retaining traditional
partnership style penalties for wrongful dissociation, resembling
the wrongful dissolution remedies developed under general
partnership law, should effectively curb members from exercis-
16. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Part I1(A).
18. See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, California's New Limited Liability Company
Act: A Look at the Good, the Bad, and the Ambiguous, 27 PAC. L.J. 261, 284-87
(1996).
19. See Kalinka, supra, note 8, at 767, 787.
914 [Vol. 49:3:909
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ing their right to dissociate abusively."
Part III then identifies the federal gift and estate tax valua-
tion provisions as the new driving tax force dictating the sub-
stantive business provisions concerning dissociation rights in
LLCs.21 The rules governing eligibility for discounted valuation
of gifts and bequests between family members conclusively deny
any opportunity to discount the valuation if the relevant state
statute provides for transfer or liquidation rights in the business
interest gifted or bequeathed. In order to render the LLC suit-
able for family gift and estate tax planning, Alabama, and many
other states have eliminated all dissociation rights in the statu-
tory default provisions, causing closely held LLCs to be subject
to the same perils currently faced by minority shareholders of
close corporations.22 By requiring the state law statutory de-
fault provisions to eliminate all dissociation rights in order to
qualify for the discounted valuation, the gift and estate tax rules
force state legislators to choose between preserving the interests
of small unsophisticated business owners benefiting from statu-
tory dissociation rights and legitimate family gift and estate tax
plans using the LLC.'
II. RIGHTS TO WITHDRAW CAPITAL IN PARTNERSHIP AND
CORPORATE FORMS
A. General Partnerships Governed by the
Uniform Partnership Act
Even before the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA), completed
in 1914,' became effective the common law recognized that all
changes in the relationship among the partners resulted in a
dissolution of that partnership.' The UPA codified the events
20. See infra notes 102-105 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 106-118 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
23. See supra notes 11-12, infra notes 106-116 and accompanying text.
24. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT [hereinafter UPA], reprinted in BROMBERG &
RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP app. A (1988). For an exhaustive and excellent treatise on
partnership law and practice see J. WILLIAM CALLISON, PARTNERSHIP LAW AND PRAC-
TICE, GENERAL AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS (1992 & Supp. 1995).
25. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 24, § 7.01. See also Smith v. Rosson,
1998] 915
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triggering a dissolution-a partner's death, insanity, retirement,
withdrawal or bankruptcy-causing the business to either be
sold in a judicial sale and wound up, or continued in a successor
partnership." The right of every partner to unilaterally dis-
solve the partnership and demand a judicial sale of the assets
created the opportunity for partners to abuse this power. A part-
ner with limited economic resources could lose his share of the
business at an unfairly low price. As long as a withdrawing
partner with sufficient assets to purchase the entire business
avoided being classified as a wrongful dissolver, such partner's
bid conclusively set the fair market value of the entire business
and each partner's rights in the liquidation. If the other partner
lacked the economic resources to counterbid for the business, the
withdrawing partner had no incentive to bid a fair price. 7
A partner who dissolves the partnership wrongfully has no
right to bid for the business and is liable for damages to the
other partners. Moreover, the partners not responsible for the
wrongful dissolution can avoid a judicial sale and continue the
business in a new partnership after buying out the wrongful
partner. In addition to subtracting damages from the buyout
price, the wrongful partner receives no compensation for a share
of good will in the continuing partnership.' In order to protect
partners who bargained ahead of time for a definite term or
particular undertaking from damages due to another partner's
premature withdrawal, the Uniform Partnership Act conclusive-
ly deems a partner's withdrawal before the completion of a defi-
nite term or a particular undertaking as wrongful.'
However, because many partnerships operate informally
171 So. 375 (Ala. 1936) (concluding that dissolution occurred three years after
partner's stroke-the time of total incapacity); McKleroy v. Muskgrove, 84 So. 280
(Ala. 1919) (deeming the partnership dissolved due to partner's insanity); Didlake v.
Roden Grocery Co., 49 So. 384 (Ala. 1909) (finding that death of a partner dissolved
the firm); Butts v. Cooper, 44 So. 616 (Ala. 1907) (one partner's purchase of another
partner's interest deemed to dissolve the partnership under pre-UPA Alabama law).
26. See UPA § 31.
27. See UPA §§ 29, 31, 38 (stating no explicit requirement that the partner bid
a fair price); Cude v. Couch, 588 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. 1979) (upholding a partner's
withdrawal followed by a low bid for the assets). See also Franklin A. Gevurtz, Pre-
venting Partnership Freeze-outs, 40 MERCER L. REV. 535 (1989).
28. UPA § 38(2XcXII).
29. UPA § 31(2); BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 24, § 7.03.
916 [Vol. 49:3:909
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and the facts and circumstances sometimes strongly suggest that
the partners intended to remain partners for a term or specific
undertaking, some courts were willing to imply a term or under-
taking even when they have not explicitly so agreed. Conse-
quently partners prematurely withdrawing before the end of an
implied term or undertaking will also be treated as wrongful
dissolvers. ° Courts look for strong evidence that the partners
manifested clear intent to stay partners for a period of time or to
complete a separate project; courts refuse to imply a term solely
because the partners entered a specific business."' Consequent-
ly, situations arose where the facts and circumstances could not
support an implied term under circumstances where the facts
strongly indicated that one partner had abused the power to
dissolve the partnership. 2
Even if the facts and circumstances could not imply a term
or undertaking, some courts treated a withdrawing partner as a
wrongful dissolver if the partner breached his fiduciary duty to
the other partner by seeking to appropriate the entire business
at an unfairly low price.' The determination of whether a
withdrawal amounted to a breach of fiduciary duty was predict-
30. See Rhue v. Dawson, 841 P.2d 215 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (implying a term or
undertaking for a partnership to purchase and develop a single shopping center);
Zeibak v. Nasser, 82 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1938) (concluding that a period covering a lease
of theaters implies a term); Bates v. McTammany, 76 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1938) (conclud-
ing that period covering a federal license to operate radio station implies a term);
Girard Bank v. Haley, 332 A.2d 443 (Penn. 1975) (concluding that partnership was
for an undertaking where partnership formed to develop and sell a specific tract of
land); Williams v. Terebinski, 24 Ohio Misc. 53, 261 N.E.2d 920 (1970) (implying an
undertaking for a partnership formed to purchase two cemeteries and sell plots).
31. See CALLISON, supra note 24, at 15-9, § 15.03.
32. See Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1961) (refusing to imply term to cover
period of time allowing the partnership to repay certain debts and make profits from
the business; consequently, low bid for the assets by one partner upheld); Chandler
Med. Bldg. Partners v. Chandler Dental Group, 855 P.2d 787 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993)
(refusing to imply a term for a partnership formed to own, develop, and lease prop-
erty).
33. See Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1961) (dictum) (suggesting that a with-
drawing partner acting in bad faith, dissolving the partnership in order to acquire
the other partners' share of the business at an unfairly low price, will be deemed
wrongful); Wilensky v. Blalock, 414 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. 1992) (concluding that a partner
wrongfully dissolved the partnership by freezing out plaintiff partner from further
business opportunities). See also Zimmerman v. Harding, 227 U.S. 489 (1913) and




ably hard to determine. Ultimately the threat of wrongful status
at best has served as a spotty and unpredictable deterrent to op-
portunistic withdrawals intended to appropriate the other
partner's share of the business.'
B. The Revised Uniform Partnership Act
In response to an American Bar Association Committee
report recommending extensive changes to the UPA, 5 the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
promulgated the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) in
1994 after many drafts and much discussion."6 The Alabama
Legislature recently adopted RUPA in 1996, effective January,
1997."7 RUPA completely rewrites the dissolution provisions
seeking to make partnerships somewhat less dissolvable while
still preserving the individual partner's right to withdraw her
capital.' Borrowing from the law of corporations, RUPA ex-
pressly views the partnership as an entity, 9 creating a theoret-
ical basis for allowing the same partnership to remain legally
intact even if a partner dies, withdraws, or otherwise becomes
34. See Cude v. Couch, 588 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. 1979) (rejecting plaintiff partner's
assertion that the other partner wrongfully dissolved the partnership under facts and
circumstances that strongly suggest the withdrawing partner, who successfully pur-
chased the business through an undisclosed agent, intended to usurp the plaintiff
partner's share of the goodwill). See also Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering With-
in Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 468 (1987) (concluding that when dissolu-
tions of partnerships without a term are wrongful is a major issue of partnership
law).
35. See also Donald J. Weidner, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act Mid-
stream: Major Policy Decisions, 21 U. TOL. L. REv. 825 (1990); Donald J. Weidner,
Three Policy Decisions Animate Revision of Uniform Partnership Act, 46 Bus. LAW.
427 (Feb. 1991).
36. RUPA (1994). See also Donald J. Weidner & John W. Larson, The Revised
Uniform Partnership Act: The Reporters' Overview, 49 BUS. LAW. 1 (Nov. 1993);
BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP, SPECIAL RELEASE ON THE REVISED UNI-
FORM PARTNERSHIP ACT (1993). But see Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform
Partnership Act: Not Ready for Prime Time, 49 Bus. LAw. 45 (Nov. 1993) (criticizing
portions of RUPA).
37. ALA. CODE § 10-8A-101 to -1109 (Supp. 1996) (unless the text of footnotes
clearly state otherwise, citations to RUPA also refer to Alabama's RUPA with no
substantive variations).
38. RUPA §§ 601-603, 701, 801.
39. RUPA § 201.
918 [Vol. 49:3:909
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separated from the partnership.4"
Rather than always expressing the departure of a partner
as a dissolution, RUPA defines a partner's death, retirement,
bankruptcy, withdrawal or other separation from the partner-
ship as a dissociation, not necessarily leading to a dissolution.41
The new term dissociation essentially mirrors the dissolution
triggering events found in the UPA. Because not all dissocia-
tions trigger dissolutions, RUPA sharply limits those circum-
stances where a partner has the accompanying right to demand
a judicial sale and bid for the business. If a dissociation event
does not cause a dissolution the dissociated partner has a right
to be redeemed at fair market value, 2 leaving the legal exis-
tence of the partnership intact.
RUPA's paradigm distinguishing which dissociation events
trigger buyouts and which only result in dissolution of the part-
nership essentially follows a modified two-pronged approach,
hinging on whether the partnership agreement contains an ex-
press term or particular undertaking.' If the partnership
agreement does not contain a term or particular undertaking,
RUPA labels it as a partnership at will. If the partnership is at-
will, all dissociation events, except a partner's voluntary with-
drawal, result in no dissolution of the partnership thus trigger-
ing buy out rights only for the dissociated partner." Conse-
quently, the partnership continues to exist as the same legal
entity after the buy out of the dissociated partner's interest
much like a corporation that has redeemed a shareholder's
stock.
45
A partner's voluntary withdrawal from an at will partner-
ship conclusively dissolves the partnership, allowing each part-
40. See note 36 supra.
41. RUPA § 601 (1994).
42. RUPA § 701(b) & Alabama cmts. 1 & 3. RUPA requires the valuation to
equal the greater of going concern or liquidation value. RUPA § 801 determines
which dissociation events trigger absolute dissolutions, dissolution possibilities or buy
out rights only.
43. RUPA § 601 (identifying dissociation events) and §§ 801(1) and (2)
(concluding that which dissociation events cause dissolution, liquidation, and winding
up of the partnership business hinge on whether the partnership is for a term or at-
will).




ner the absolute right to demand a judicial sale of the
partnership's assets.' Even if the remaining partners settle the
pay out for the withdrawing partner and continue the business
in an uninterrupted fashion, the old partnership still technically
ceases to exist with the business being continued in a new part-
nership.47 The drafters of RUPA probably deemed it necessary
to retain the right of at-will partners to dissolve the partnership
in order to ensure a mechanism to cut off personal liability expo-
sure." As long as the same partnership remains legally intact,
a partner remains personally liable for partnership debts arising
before withdrawing from the partnership, even long after the
withdrawal.49 Thus, the only way for a partner to sever all pos-
sibilities of personal liability exposure is to dissolve the partner-
ship. The personal liability exposure faced by all partners in
general partnerships forced the RUPA drafters to preserve the
absolute right to withdraw and dissolve an at-will partnership.
If the partnership is for a stated term or a particular under-
taking, all wrongful dissociations trigger the possibility of a dis-
solution. Some examples of wrongful dissociations include volun-
tary withdrawal, bankruptcy or judicial expulsion before the
completion of the term or undertaking. Certain other dissocia-
tions, such as death or incompetence before the end of the term
or undertaking, also trigger the possibility of a dissolution.0
Unlike the dissolution of an at-will partnership, which allows all
partners the absolute right to demand a judicial sale, partners of
term or undertaking partnerships do not enjoy an absolute right
to a judicial sale. If a majority of the nondissociating partners
want to continue the partnership the dissolution can effectively
be thwarted.5 If the nondissociating partners avoid the poten-
46. RUPA § 801(1) and cmt. 3.
47. Id.
48. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, §§ 11.14, 11.16 (stating that part-
ners must have some ability to dissolve in order to cut off lingering personal liabili-
ty); PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT, commentary to § 802 (stating that historically,
partnerships were concerned about indefinite personal liability).
49. RUPA § 806 (governing partners' liability to other partners after dissolution);
RUPA § 703 (stating that without dissolution, a dissociated partner's liability lasts
two years after dissociation).
50. RUPA §§ 801(2), 602(b), 601(6)-(10).
51. RUPA § 801(2). The Alabama language differs from RUPA, as enacted by
NCCSUL, in one minor and in one mqjor respect. The language of Alabama's
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tial dissolution of the partnership, the dissociating partner and
those partners who do not want to continue have the right to be
bought out by the partnership.52
Although RUPA substantially increases the stability of part-
nerships by substituting partnership dissolution triggers with
dissociations, allowing buy out rights only, RUPA leaves in place
the one scenario under the UPA where many partners risked
their share of the business being appropriated by a more power-
ful partner. Because under RUPA all withdrawals in an at-will
partnership still always dissolve the partnership giving each
partner the absolute right to demand a judicial sale, only a find-
ing that the withdrawing partner has wrongfully dissolved the
partnership can protect the less powerful partner.
Unlike the UPA, which left open the possibility of finding
wrongful dissolutions through implied terms and fiduciary duty
breaches, RUPA attempts to define "wrongful" more precisely by
stating that a dissolution is wrongful only if "it is in breach of
an express provision of the partnership agreement" or if a part-
ner withdraws, suffers bankruptcy or judicial expulsion before
the completion of a term or particular undertaking.' Arguably
under RUPA, unlike the UPA, under no circumstance will the
withdrawal from an at-will partnership amount to wrongful
conduct.' On the other hand, because RUPA imposes an abso-
§ 801(2) speaks of at least half the partners affirmatively expressing a desire for the
dissolution to go forward while RUPA's § 801(2) refers to a majority agreeing to con-
tinue. Either way, a "majority" threshold of the partners must want to continue the
partnership to avoid a dissolution.
The major difference emphasizes how to measure majority consent. RUPA
§ 801(2), as promulgated by NCCSUL, requires a "majority in interest" measured in
economic terms to continue the partnership, in order to satisfy the requirement for
lacking continuing of life under the partnership classification rules that existed be-
fore the final check-the-box regulations. See RUPA § 801, cmt. 5. Alabama's § 801(2)
contains no reference to economic interest, thus presumably the majority required to
continue the partnership constitutes a majority of the number of partners (head
count). Because lacking continuity of life is no longer relevant for partnership classi-
fication, Alabama's head count test carries no risk and will inevitably be simpler to
administer.
52. RUPA § 701(a).
53. RUPA § 602(b).
54. RUPA § 602(b) enumerates wrongful withdrawal to include two types of
withdrawals; withdrawals from a term partnership or a partnership for a particular
undertaking and withdrawals in breach of an express provision of the partnership
agreements. Express provision may be said to exclude any implied contracts, includ-
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lute minimum level of fiduciary duty protection to all partners
and requires all partners to act in good faith with fair deal-
ing,' arguably RUPA leaves room to find wrongful withdraw-
als, even in partnerships with no explicit terms or undertakings,
if the withdrawal violates the minimum fiduciary duties or
clearly shows bad faith and unfair dealing.'
The elimination of all statutory dissolutions of Alabama
LLCs by the new legislation represents sound business policy.
The right to compel dissolution serves no meaningful goal and
ing the contracts of good faith and fair dealing, or the fiduciary duties, which cannot
be contractually eliminated. RUPA § 602(b). See infra note 56. See also Carter G.
Bishop, Treatment of Members Upon Their Death and Withdrawal from a Limited
Liability Company: The Case for a Uniform Paradigm, 25 STETSON L. REV. 255, 269
n.57 (1995) (LLC symposium article stating that ULLCA § 602(bXl) provides that
dissociation from an at-will LLC is wrongful only where "specifically made wrongful
by the operating agreemen").
55. RUPA § 103(bX3) (stating that partners are unable to contractually elimi-
nate entirely the basic duty of loyalty).
See also Donald J. Weidner, Cadwalader, RUPA and Fiduciary Duty, 54
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 877, 908 (1997); Gary W. Derrick, Oklahoma Limited Liability
Companies and Limited Liability Partnerships, 22 OKLA. Crry U.L. REV. 643, 676
(1997); Michael K. Pierce, Substantive Partnership Law: Special Problems of General
and Limited Partnerships, SB85 ALI-ABA Course of Study 1, 41 (May 1, 1997); Elisa
Feldman, Your Partner's Keeper: The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under
the RUPA, 48 SMU L. REV. 1931, 1944 (1995).
56. See RUPA § 404 & cmts. The behavior of a partner dissociating from an at-
will partnership with the clear intent of appropriating the entire business for herself
should both violate the minimum fiduciary duties and amount to bad faith and un-
fair dealing. Because § 103(bX3) of RUPA forbids the total elimination of fiduciary
duties, and §§ 103(bX4) and (bX5) forbid the elimination of the duties of care and
good faith, RUPA cannot possibly allow a partner to dissolve the partnership in a
manner that clearly violates the minimum fiduciary duties.
Comment 4 of § 404 recognizes that the good faith obligation may create a
duty for a partner to affirmatively disclose information beyond the duties established
in the statute. This could operate to make an otherwise proper withdrawal wrongful
in light of § 103(bX3) requirements. Since no definition of "good faith and fair deal-
ing" is provided, the courts will have to develop the meaning through case law (see
cmt. 4), which, based on prior cases, could certainly declare a withdrawal wrongful
even under an at-will agreement. See, e.g., Wilensky v. Blalock, 414 S.E.2d 1 (Ga.
1992); Reid v. Bickel & Brewer, 1990 WL 129199 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1990); Page v.
Page, 359 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1961).
See also Robert W. Hillman, RUPA and Former Partners: Cutting the Gordian
Knot with Continuing Partnership Entities, 58 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 7 n.17
(1995) (stating that actions that violate the intent of the partnership agreement are
still recognized by RUPA as breaches of the agreement thus raising the possibility




sets up the opportunity for an economically powerful member to
purchase the entire business from the others at an unfairly low
price. Unlike RUPA, which vests with each partner the absolute
power to withdraw from and dissolve an at-will partnership, no
policy justification exists to retain dissolution in LLCs. In a
general partnership, the personal liability exposure of each gen-
eral partner justifies allowing each partner the right to dissolve
an at-will partnership." Because only a dissolution eliminates
the entity and any liabilities up to that time, a partner no longer
wanting to associate with the others needs the ability to dissolve
the entity in order to avoid being held personally liable for debts
allegedly incurred before the partner's withdrawal. Because
LLCs offer limited liability protection to all members, no reason
exists to allow LLC members the absolute right to dissolve the
LLC.5
C. Corporations
The corporation represents the business form that is the
most difficult to dissolve.59 Under traditional corporation law, a
corporation may voluntarily dissolve by a recommendation by
the board of directors followed by two-thirds of all votes entitled
to be cast. The corporate statutes generally provide no rights for
individual shareholders to dissolve the corporation or demand
the corporation to redeem their shares.' In a widely held or
publicly traded corporation, dissatisfied shareholders can simply
sell their shares on the market and therefore generally do not
need a comparable right to a partner's dissociation rights.61
57. See supra notes 48-50, and accompanying text.
58. See PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT, commentary to § 802 (concluding that
limited liability protection provided by LLCs provides a good reason for allowing
LLCs to eliminate the right of dissolution under the statute).
59. ALA. CODE §§ 10-2B-1.01 to -17.03 (1994) (containing Alabama's law of cor-
porations). For an excellent textbook on general corporations law, see ROBERT
CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAw (1986). For a comprehensive and excellent treatise
on Alabama Corporate Law, see THIGPEN, supra note 5. For an excellent and useful
treatise on corporations, see JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS (1995).
60. See REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 14.02, and AIA. CODE § 10-2B-14.02
(1994) (stating that corporation dissolves when two-thirds of shareholders vote, rati-
fying the board's recommendation to dissolve; the articles can reduce required vote
to a majority; shareholders by unanimous vote can directly dissolve the corporation
through written consent). For a full treatment of corporate dissolution, see Cox, su-
pra note 59, §§ 14, 26.
61. See CHARLES R. OXELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND
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However, shareholders of closely held corporations without a
ready market for their shares often found themselves trapped in
the corporation.62 Problems typically arise when a particular
shareholder has trouble getting along with the rest of the share-
holders, who, as a group, have the power of the majority block to
elect the entire board of directors and appoint the officers. The
majority shareholders through their control of the board typical-
ly withhold all dividends, exclude the minority shareholder from
the corporate payroll, while paying themselves large salaries as
officers."
Over time, both courts and legislatures 4 recognized a need
to alter the traditional corporate law to provide relief for minori-
ty shareholders in closely held corporations. Leading the way,
courts borrowed fiduciary duties from partnership law and pro-
vided equitable relief for a minority shareholder if the majority
shareholders acted wrongfully by denying the shareholder any
income from the company through salaries or dividends while
attempting to force the shareholder to sell shares at an unfairly
OTHER BuSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 499 (2d ed. 1996).
62. See Cookies Food Prod. Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430 N.W.2d
437 (Iowa 1988) (allowing majority shareholders who received large salaries while
minority shareholders received no salaries or dividends to successfully prove fairness
to the corporation because the corporation was profitable); Jefferson County Truck
Growers Ass'n v. Tanner, 341 So. 2d 485, 487 (Ala. 1977) (stating that unless corpo-
ration suffers actual injury no grounds for derivative suit exist); Ingalls Found. v.
Ingalls Iron Works, 98 So. 2d 30, 39 (Ala. 1957); (concluding actions of directors are
not sufficient to show unfairness to the corporation or bad faith). See also ONEAL
& THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 10. See generally F. HODGE O'NEAL
& ROBERT B. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (1991-95) (Supp.
1996) [hereinafter MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS].
63. See O'NEAL & THOMPSON, MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 62, ch. 3
(describing in detail the techniques used to squeeze out a minority shareholder);
THIGPEN, supra note 5, ch. 9; Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Ac-
tion For Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699 (1993).
64. In an attempt to address the inability of traditional corporate law to deal
with the business problems of close corporations, state legislatures adopted close cor-
poration supplements. Shareholders of closely held corporations could elect, if the
corporation qualified, to be governed by the close corporation supplement instead of
the general corporation law. Although the close corporation supplement tried to treat
the corporation more like a partnership, the supplement failed to address the most
significant problem faced by the shareholders, that of no liquidity of shares, because
any dissolution or redemption rights had to be affirmatively provided for in the arti-
cles. Alabama had a close corporation supplement until it adopted the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act in 1994. See generally THIGPEN, supra note 5, § 9-11.
924
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low price.'
The Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA) con-
tinued this trend by allowing shareholders a statutory right to
petition the court to dissolve the corporation if the majority
shareholders through their control of the board are guilty of
oppressive conduct. Alabama adopted the RMBCA in 1994, thus
creating for the first time new statutory remedies for Alabama
close corporation shareholders being squeezed out by majority
shareholders." Once a shareholder files a petition seeking an
involuntary dissolution, the other shareholders have ninety days
to purchase the shareholder's interest at fair market value. If
the other shareholders refuse to buy out the complaining share-
65. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975); Wilkes
v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976) (most frequently
cited cases recognizing modified partnership fiduciary duties among close corporation
shareholders). See also Rexford Rand Corp. v. Ancel, 58 F.3d 1215 (7th Cir. 1995)
(recognizing fiduciary duties in close corporations under Illinois law); Alaska Plastics,
Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980) (remanding for a factual determination
of whether a close corporation remedy is appropriate); Van Schaack v. Van Schaack
Holdings, Ltd., 856 P.2d 15 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Yackel v. Kay, 642 N.E.2d 1107
(Ohio 1994); Frank Lerner & Assocs. v. Vassy, 599 N.E.2d 734 (Ohio 1991); Crosby
v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 1989); Thompson v. Central Ohio Cellular Inc., 639
N.E.2d 462 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); Koos v. Central Ohio Cellular, Inc., 641 N.E.2d
265 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing fiduciary duties in the close corporation con-
text, but holding that defendants did not breach their fiduciary duties to minority
shareholders under those specific facts); Gigax v. Repka, 615 N.E.2d 644 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1992); Masinter v. WEBCO Co., 262 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1980) (reversing sum-
mary judgment and remanding for factual findings to determine if majority share-
holder conduct wrongful); O'EAL & THOMPSON, MiNoRrrY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note
62, §§ 7:03-:04.
66. 1994 Ala. Acts 343, effective Jan. 1, 1995. ALA. CODE § 10-2B-14.30(2Xii)
provides statutory remedy of judicial dissolution for oppressed minority shareholders,
and under section 10-2B-14.34, as an alternative to dissolution, either the corpora-
tion or the remaining shareholders can elect a buyout of the complaining sharehold-
er at fair value. See section 10-2B-14.34 comm. Although the buyout option has not
been available as a statutory remedy before Jan. 1, 1995, Alabama courts have had
equitable powers to order whatever remedies they deem appropriate upon a
petitioner's showing of oppression under previous statutes since 1959. See Abel v.
Forrest Realty, 484 So. 2d 1069, 1072 (Ala. 1986) (citing the authority of former
Alabama corporate law); ALA. CODE § 10-2A-195(aXlXb); Belcher v. Birmingham
Trust Nat'l Bank, 348 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Ala. 1968) (citing ALA. CODE § 10-2A-76
and concluding controlling stockholders' fiduciary obligations and courts' jurisdiction
to remedy oppression unimpaired by statute). Section 10-2A-76 is Alabama's prede-
cessor to section 10-2B-8.31. ALA. CODE § 10-2B-8.31 cmt. 2. See also Fulton v.
Callahan, 621 So. 2d 1235, 1251 (Ala. 1993) (fashioning a remedy using ALA. CODE
§§ 10-2A-195 and 10-2A-76, ordering buyout of petitioner's shares, which later be-
came available under section 10-2B-14.34).
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holder, the court must decide if grounds exist to order an actual
dissolution of the corporation or some other remedy, the most
common being a buyout of the minority shares."' Regardless
whether the relief sought is equitable or statutorily based, the
complaining shareholder still must prove wrongful behavior by
the majority.'
Even before the Alabama legislature adopted the RMBCA
and the statutory remedies for oppression that came with it, the
Alabama Supreme Court granted equitable remedies for minori-
ty shareholders showing that the majority group breached fidu-
ciary duties.69 Alabama commentators labeled this remedy as
the "tort of oppression "  marked by behavior designed to de-
prive the minority shareholders of any return on their shares.7'
Under the facts, however, if the majority's conduct fails to reach
a high level of wrongful behavior, the court will refuse to exer-
cise its equitable powers,7" even under circumstances where
67. REv. MODEL BuS. CORP. ACT §§ 14.30-.34 (1990); ALABAMA BuS. CORP. ACT
§§ 14.30-14.34 (1994). See generally Joshua M. Henderson, Buyout Remedy For Op-
pressed Minority Shareholders, 47 S.C. L. REv. 195 (1995); Ian Ayres, Judging Close
Corporations in the Age of Statutes, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 365 (1992); Dennis S. Kaijala,
An Analysis of Close Corporation Legislation in the United States, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
663 (1989).
68. REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 14.30-.34
69. See sources cited at infra note 71.
70. See Andrew P. Campbell, Litigating Minority Shareholder Rights and the
New Tort of Oppression, 53 ALA. LAW. 108 (1992); Michael E. DeBow, 'Oppression"
of Minority Shareholders: Contract, Not Tort, 54 ALA. LAw. 128 (1993). See also
James Christopher McCool, Comment, Michaud v. Morris and Minority Shareholder
Oppression in Alabama: Attempting to Clarify an Ambiguous Cause of Action, 44
ALA. L. REV. 621 (1993).
71. Gilliland v. USCO Power Equip. Corp., 631 So. 2d 938 (Ala. 1994) (holding
that minority shareholder stated valid cause of action due to wrongful behavior of
majority shareholder and remanding to lower court for findings of fact); Ex parte
Brown, 562 So. 2d 485 (Ala. 1990) (ordering relief when majority shareholder used
corporate assets to benefit another business that minority shareholder enjoyed no
benefits from); Fulton v. Callahan, 621 So. 2d 1235 (Ala. 1993) (ordering relief when
majority shareholders reduced minority shareholder's salary and attempted to value
his shares too low during buyout negotiations). See also THIGPEN, supra note 5, § 9-
2 (stating that Alabama courts are moving toward partnership-like fiduciary duties
between close corporation shareholders, at least in cases of freeze-out of minority
shareholders by the majority). See also Michaud v. Morris, 603 So. 2d 886 (Ala.
1992) (refusing to order relief under the facts, but strong dicta states that sharehold-
ers in close corporations have a right to share in corporation earnings, and a majori-
ty cannot frustrate these rights by failing to declare dividends or otherwise manipu-
late corporate earnings to squeeze out minority interests).
72. See Michaud v. Morris, 603 So. 2d 886 (Ala. 1992) (refusing to allow an
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arguably the minority successfully showed some level of wrong-
ful conduct.73
Courts and commentators dealing directly with statutory
oppression remedies like the one offered by the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act and the Alabama Business Corpora-
tion Law have struggled over the statutory definition of oppres-
sion.74 Although to date there have been no cases in Alabama
where the Alabama Supreme Court has directly defined oppres-
sion under the Alabama Business Corporation Law, no valid
policy justifies an interpretation that materially differs from the
level of wrongful conduct Alabama courts have historically re-
quired in order to grant equitable remedies under Alabama's
common law remedy known as the tort of oppression.75 More-
over, court decisions in other jurisdictions defining the threshold
of majority wrongful conduct may prove helpful by analogy if
equitable remedy when minority shareholder fired as manager of a restaurant due to
business failure); Abel v. Forrest Realty, Inc., 484 So. 2d 1069 (Ala. 1986) (conclud-
ing minority shareholder unable to show wrongful conduct solely by demonstrating
his lack of control); Stallworth v. AmSouth Bank of Alabama, 1997 WL 778838 (Ala.
Dec. 19, 1997) (concluding that minority shareholder unable to show oppres-
sion/squeeze-out simply because rest of board voted against his wishes).
73. See Fisher v. Bankers' Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 155 So. 538 (Ala. 1934);
Johnston v. Livingston Nursing Home, Inc., 211 So. 2d 151 (Ala. 1968) (concluding
that mere quarrels between shareholders do not constitute wrongful behavior by
majority).
74. See In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (defining oppression
as defeating minority shareholder's reasonable expectations at the time of the forma-
tion of the contract; court ordered corporation to buy out minority shareholder's
interest); In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1984) (con-
cluding oppression clearly present when dividends suspended only after the share-
holder attained minority status; court ordered a buyout); Meiselman v. Meiselman,
307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983) (finding oppression where the majority shareholders
diverted profits away from the minority shareholder, resulting in frustration of the
shareholder's reasonable expectations). See generally Thompson, supra note 63; Law-
rence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1675 (1990) (concluding that oppression statutes are moving toward providing
less protection than equitable remedies because often minority shareholder must
demonstrate intentional wrongful conduct).
75. This assumes that the Alabama Supreme Court is generally satisfied with
the standard of wrongful conduct that minority shareholders must prove to qualify
for relief. If the Alabama Supreme Court later decides to change the standard (i.e.,
either require the minority shareholder to prove a lower or higher threshold of
wrongful conduct in order to get relief), the new level of proof should apply in the
same manner to minority shareholders seeking relief under the court's equitable
powers or the involuntary dissolution statute.
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those decisions are consistent with Alabama's general policy of
articulating when majority shareholders' conduct reaches a level
of wrongfulness justifying allowing a remedy for the minority
shareholders.76
The problems associated with the breakup of a business
focus on opposite perspectives when comparing close corpora-
tions and partnerships. In the partnership context the opportu-
nity of the withdrawing partner to economically take advantage
of other partners arises due to the liquid nature of the invest-
ment, in legal terms, the general right to dissolve an at-will
partnership. Even if the partner's dissociation results in no
dissolution, the withdrawing partner still has the right to be
bought out by the partnership and these rights cannot be con-
tractually eliminated. 77 Because partners have the right to re-
coup their investment, any abusive behavior more often comes
from the withdrawing partner rather than those remaining in
the business, especially in at-will partnerships where the with-
drawing partner has the absolute right to dissolve the partner-
ship and demand a judicial sale.
In the close corporation context the illiquid nature of the
investment, legally the fact that corporate law provides no re-
demption rights for individual shareholders without an explicit
contractual provision, provides the majority shareholders seek-
ing to remain in the business an opportunity to squeeze out the
minority shareholder. Consequently, statutory drafters consider-
ing changes to the dissociation provisions in LLC statutes must
make a basic policy choice between the corporation and partner-
ship models. A corporate based model favors eliminating, while a
partnership based model favors retaining individual dissociation
rights in the statutory default provisions.
76. See, e.g., Belcher v. Birmingham Trust, 348 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Ala. 1968);
Smith v. Flynn, 155 So. 2d 497 (Ala. 1963) (examples where Alabama courts used
other states' authorities by analogy).
77. RUPA §§ 103(bX6), 602(a).
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III. POLICY ISSUES WHEN DRAFTING LLC
STATUTORY DISSOCIATION PROVISIONS
A The Business Debate: Partnership or
Corporate Model?
The Internal Revenue Service's recent regulations, eliminat-
ing the need to make LLCs statutorily dissolvable upon a change
in the members, frees all state legislatures, including Alabama's,
to rewrite the default provisions governing member dissocia-
tions."' As already noted, no valid business reason exists to re-
tain statutory default provisions allowing individual members to
dissolve the LLC.79 Consequently, the new Alabama
legislation's elimination of dissolution rights, that were once but
no longer needed to ensure that the LLC would meet the part-
nership classification regulations, represents a positive develop-
ment in the law of LLCs.c Alabama LLC members with insuffi-
cient economic resources to purchase the entire business no
longer risk losing their share at an unfair low price in the hands
of a more powerful member dissolving the LLC.8"
The other question, whether state LLC statutes should
retain or eliminate statutory dissociation rights triggering a
redemption by the company at a price determined by profession-
al valuation standards, contains no simple answers. In making
the decision the statutory drafters must make a fundamental
policy decision to base the statutory provision on partnership or
corporation law. Moreover, unlike dissolution triggers, dissocia-
tion with buyout rights do not carry the same potential for
abuse that currently plagues partnership law.2 Although
strong arguments exist to the contrary, when viewing this issue
only from the perspective of finding the best business policy, the
partnership model probably works best for LLCs, tilting the
78. See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 27, 56 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 77-78.
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decision in favor of leaving dissociation rights in the statute."
Long before LLCs rose into prominence, scholars debated
whether or not close corporation shareholders should have indi-
vidual rights to withdraw from the business and require the
corporation to redeem the shares. Focusing on practical charac-
teristics of the business, closely held corporations have been
directly compared to partnerships thus supporting allowing close
corporation shareholders partnership dissociation rights." Oth-
ers argue that because majority shareholders would not bargain
for partnership dissociation rules, close corporations should not
be analogized as partnerships.' Practitioners advising sophisti-
cated business owners and joint venture participants undoubted-
ly can give many examples of clients insisting that the LLC
operating agreement eliminate, as much as the tax law would
permit, all dissociation and dissolution rights." Representing
the legitimate interests of these business participants to lower
their transaction costs, this argument favors, for pure business
reasons, eliminating all dissociation rights in the LLC statute in
order to reflect what these parties would bargain for.87
Unfortunately statutory default provisions denying LLC
members dissociation rights in order to legitimately save some
business owners transaction costs comes at a heavy price for less
sophisticated persons that either cannot or will not seek compe-
tent legal advice before proceeding. The vast amount of litigation
and legislative activity struggling with the rights of minority
83. See infra notes 84-97 and accompanying text. Gevurtz, supra note 18, at 286
(concluding that California's LLC laws giving cash-out rights to LLC members pro-
vide best default rules). See also Larry E. Ribstein, The Emergence of the Limited
Liability Company, 51 Bus. LAw. 1, 27 (1995); Franklin A. Gevurtz, Squeeze-Outs
and Freeze-outs in Limited Liability Companies, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 497, 516 (1995)
(suggesting that LLC members should have rights to be cashed out in the absence
of other agreement); Gevurtz, supra note 27, at 540-41.
84. See John A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploita-
tion: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63
VAND. L. REV. 1 (1977).
85. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agen-
cy Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1986).
86. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 1.03; supra note 5 and accompa-
nying text (indicating the possibility of LLCs adopting more corporate features now
that partnership business provisions are no longer necessary to ensure partnership
taxation).
87. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 85.
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shareholders in close corporations illustrates the cost both to the
shareholders and the legal system when the shareholders no
longer get along and particular shareholders have no ability to
separate from the business." These shareholders did not and
for the most part, due to their level of sophistication, will not,
bargain ahead of time to address separations from the business.
Consequently, if harmony among unsophisticated business own-
ers using closely held corporations disappears, the minority
shareholder is forced into litigation and must affirmatively prove
a substantial level of wrongful conduct by the majority share-
holders in order to secure a court ordered buyout of their
shares.8 9
The recent elimination of dissociation rights in LLCs expos-
es unsophisticated business owners using LLCs to the same risk
of oppression and squeeze out techniques that have been faced
by similar business owners using close corporations.' On pure
business policy grounds this represents a very negative develop-
ment because LLCs have primarily developed as the small busi-
ness owners' alternative to the general partnership." Indeed
the default provisions addressing the members' agency powers to
bind and management powers over the LLC directly reflect the
provisions of the UPA and the RUPA.' Although the members
of the LLC possess the ability to override the general partner-
ship style of management by centralizing management in the
managers, the creation of managers clearly requires an affirma-
tive agreement altering the default provisions." Thus the LLC
statute itself assumes that business owners desiring a manage-
ment style closer to a traditional corporation possess the ability
to tailor their own arrangement.'
88. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
91. See RiBSTmiN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 2.02.
92. See ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-21 to -22; Boles & Hamill, supra note 3, at 148-51
(discussing general partnership origins of LLC default agency and management pow-
ers). See also supra note 12 and accompanying text (stating that recent LLC amend-
ment does not change the default provisions addressing each member's agency pow-
ers to bind the LLC and management rights).
93. See ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-21 to -22; Boles & Hamill, supra note 3, at 151-60
(discussing the creation of managers in a LLC). See also supra note 11.
94. Id. By providing default management provisions that reflect general partner-
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The policy behind drafting statutory default provisions
should seek to provide a set of rules addressing the needs of the
intended users of the business form who are least likely to plan
ahead of time. 5 The law surrounding close corporations clearly
did not develop in a logical fashion where the judicial and legis-
lative responses collectively reflected a well thought out business
policy for the business owners using the close corporations. In-
stead, close corporations developed as a reaction to vast prob-
lems experienced by small business owners using a business
form, the corporation, with default provisions and legal doctrines
totally unsuited for small business. The corporation was simply
not created for small businesses; small businesses chose to use
corporations in order to obtain limited liability under circum-
stances where as a business matter, they resembled partner-
ships in all other ways."
Unlike close corporation law, which developed in a reactive
fashion, the LLC business provisions were affirmatively modeled
after partnership law.97 Although the argument in favor of cre-
ating corporate-like rules concerning separation from the busi-
ness in order to save transaction costs raises legitimate points,
on balance, business policy would be better served if the LLC's
default provisions remained largely partnership based, leaving
in dissociation rights while eliminating dissolution rights. Leav-
ing rights of all members to dissociate in the statute will allow
unsophisticated members who have fallen out of favor with the
majority group some bargaining power when negotiating a set-
tlement, and should reduce the amount of litigation. Moreover,
ships with a direct ability to appoint managers, the LLC effectively combines the
corporate and partnership models, using the partnership model as the basis for the
default provisions. See Hamill, supra note 4, at 594-95; Boles & Hamill, supra note
3, at 148-60.
95. See CHARLEs R. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUsINESS ASSOCIATIONS 47-50 (2d ed. 1996) (describing various policy ap-
proaches to drafting statutory default provisions).
96. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Close Corporations Reconsidered, 63 TUL. L. REV.
1143 (1989) (describing the development of close corporation law).
97. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, Ch. 16 (describing in detail the
partnership tax classification rules and how the LLC's business provisions were
crafted to fit within those rules). Because the partnership classification regulations
initially developed to distinguish true business differences between partnerships and
corporations, the LLC's default provisions started out adopting a general partnership
model. See Hamill, supra note 4, at 571-81.
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LLC business participants that wish to eliminate all dissociation
rights can easily do so in the operating agreement, and by defi-
nition, normally these businesses seek adequate legal advice
concerning their business affairs.'
Statutory dissociation rights can be tailored in a way to
minimize the opportunities for the individual member to abuse
the power to dissociate. Members of LLCs with actual or implied
terms or undertakings should be required to wait until the term
or undertaking expires before any redemption rights material-
ize.' In addition to the delay of payment until the end of the
term or undertaking, members dissociating prematurely should
be liable for damages under a statutory scheme similar to
RUPA.1' °
Members of LLCs with no actual or implied term or under-
taking may encounter an individual member using the power to
dissociate in an abusive manner. For example, an LLC member
may threaten dissociation and the economic hardships that may
come with the buyout in order to gain a greater profit share or
some other advantage not bargained for. As already noted, gen-
eral partnership cases show many examples of individual part-
ners dissolving the partnership under facts that suggest the
dissolver may be trying to appropriate the other partner's share
of the business.'0 ' Although questionable uses of dissociation
powers undoubtedly will come up, the LLC statute can take at
least two steps to substantially mitigate the abuse potential.
First, eliminating statutory dissolution rights will stop most of
the opportunity to appropriate the other member's share of the
business.0 2 Unlike dissolution rights, dissociation rights confer
no rights to a judicial sale of the business and require an actual
valuation of the business separate and apart from the amount
any particular person would bid from the business.0 3 Conse-
quently, unlike general partners dissolving the partnership,
dissociating members of LLCs will not have the opportunity to
98. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
100. See RUPA art. 7 (addressing partner's dissociation when business is not
wound up).
101. See supra notes 27, 30-33 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 27, 57-58, 77 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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set an unfairly low valuation to the business through the bid-
ding process.'"4 Any remaining abuses of the power to dissoci-
ate can be largely curtailed by retaining general concepts of
wrongful dissociation if the power is used in a manner that
breaches fiduciary duty to the other members. 5
B. Effect of Estate and Gift Tax Valuation Rules on
Dissociation Provisions
Although LLC state drafting committees are now able to
craft provisions addressing statutory withdrawal rights from the
business without conforming to the former partnership classifi-
cation requirements for lacking continuity of life, ironically
Alabama's legislature, and many others, have been strongly
encouraged to, once again, put tax considerations at the fore-
front."°c Now that the legislatures have full discretion over the
dissociation provisions, for the first time the opportunity exists
to draft the business exit provisions to meet requirements under
the Estate and Gift Tax rules for discount valuations when per-
sons give or bequeath LLC interests to family members."7 Be-
104. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. See also Drashner v. Sorenson, 63
N.W.2d 255 (S.D. 1954) (finding a partner's threat of withdrawal in order to get
more distribution rights to be wrongful).
106. Several states other than Alabama have recently passed legislation or have
bills pending that do away with all dissociation rights, rendering LLC members in-
distinguishable from close corporation shareholders. For new legislation, see S. 266,
20th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1997); 1997 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 282 (West) (amending
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-707); 1997 Conn. Legis. Serv. 97-70 (S.S.B. 1193) (West)
(amending CONNEcTIcuT GENERAL STAT. ANN. § 34-159); 1997 Ill. Legis. Serv. 90-424
(West) (adding ILL. ComP. STAT. §§ 180/35-50/35-55, & /35-60); 1997 Iowa Legis.
Serv. Ch. 188 (West) (changing IowA CODE ANN. § 490A.704); 1997 Md. Laws 659;
1997 Mich. Legis. Serv. 52 (West) (adding § 304 to MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 450.4304); 1997 N.H. Laws ch. 120 (amending RSA 304-C:41); 1997 Ohio Laws 73
(amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1705.16(c) (1997)). For recently introduced legis-
lation, see S.J. 154, 1998 Miss. Reg. Sess. and H. 928, 1998 Miss. Reg. Sess.
(amending MISs. CODE ANN. § 79-29-307(3)); 1997 R.I. Pub. Laws Ch. 188, §§ 5-6
(amending R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-16-29).
107. Limited partnerships have always been an effective tool for gift and estate
tax planning. See Troy Renkemeyer, The Family Limited Partnership: An Effective
Estate Planning Tool, DIGEST OF TAX ARTICLES, Nov. 1996, at 77; Louis A. Mezzullo,
Family Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, SB05 ALI-ABA 35,
42-43 (July 18, 1996). Before the Internal Revenue Service issued the check-the-box
regulations, LLCs were not suitable for family gift and estate tax planning because
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cause the law concerning valuation of interests in business
forms places a high degree of emphasis on the statutory provi-
sions addressing the ability of the recipient to transfer or liqui-
date the interest, Alabama and many other states have been
strongly encouraged to eliminate all statutory dissociation rights
in LLCs without fully considering the impact on other business-
es using LLCs outside the family gift and estate planning con-
text.
1°8
When valuing an ownership interest in a corporation, part-
nership or LLC for purposes of the estate and gift tax, generally
the inability to transfer or liquidate the interest results in a
valuation discount from the true fair market value which trans-
lates into less tax."° Section 2704(b) of the Internal Revenue
Code, however, places substantial limitations on the ability to
discount the value of gifts and bequests between family mem-
bers even if the family members cannot transfer or liquidate the
shares of stock or interest in the partnership or LLC. This provi-
sion conclusively assumes that any restrictions on transfer or
liquidation rights are not real if the family as a unit controls the
business even if these restrictions otherwise meet the general
requirement for discounted valuation." °
Section 2704(b)(3)(B) provides an exception to the draconian
rule denying discounted valuation to all transfers of business
interests between family members. Under section 2704(b)(2)(B)
gifts or bequests of corporate shares, partnership or LLC inter-
ests among family members can qualify for discounted valuation,
if the relevant statute governing the business organization re-
stricts the recipient's ability to transfer or liquidate the interest
in the business organization."' In other words, the Internal
of the necessity to lack continuity of life. See note 4 supra.
108. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
109. I.R.C. § 2703(b) (stating that restrictions on the right to sell or use property
can be considered when valuing the property as long as the restriction is (1) a bona
fide business arrangement, (2) not a device to make transfers among family mem-
bers for less than adequate consideration, and (3) the terms are similar to compara-
ble arms length transactions).
110. I.R.C. §§ 2704(bX1) and (bX2). For purposes of gift and estate valuation
these provisions disregard applicable restrictions, generally the ability to liquidate
the corporate or partnership interests, if the family unit controls the business.
111. I.R.C. § 2704(bX3XB) (providing exception to the rule disregarding applicable
restrictions in IRC § 2704(bXl), if the restriction is provided by Federal or State
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Revenue Code when dictating which transfers of business inter-
ests among family members can qualify for discounted valuation
makes a sharp distinction based on the state statutory default
provisions governing the ability to dissociate and receive buyout
rights. LLCs organized in states where the statutory default
provisions provide dissociation rights can never qualify for dis-
counted valuation if interests are gifted or bequeathed among
family members. This is true even if the relevant LLC operating
agreement eliminates the statutory dissociation rights, render-
ing the member legally in the same position as a close corpora-
tion shareholder or a member of a LLC that never had dissoci-
ation rights in the statute.
In order to use LLCs as gift and estate tax planning vehi-
cles, practitioners are understandably lobbying their state legis-
latures to eliminate all dissociation rights in the statute."2 Al-
though no commentary exists, the elimination of all. dissociation
rights in Alabama LLCs was probably motivated by a desire to
use. LLCs in the gift and estate tax planning context. Unfortu-
nately, the elimination of statutory dissociation rights will nega-
tively affect many unsophisticated small business users of LLCs
who are in no way engaging in complex gift and estate tax plan-
ning."' The overly formalistic emphasis in section 2704(b) on
the source of the transfer and liquidation restrictions (restric-
tions originating in the statute can produce valid discounts
while contractual restrictions cannot) has replaced the partner-
ship classification requirements as the driving force dictating
the provisions governing individual rights to withdraw from the
business. Alabama and all other state legislatures that have
revised or are revising their LLC statutes to eliminate the disso-
lution and dissociation provisions once again experience the tax
rules dictating substantive business provisions that should be
law; the exception takes it out of the disregarded applicable restrictions thus allow-
ing the family member to discount the fair market value if all other requirements to
qualify for discounted valuation are met). IRS Reg. § 25.2704-2(b) defines an applica-
ble restriction as "a limitation on the ability to liquidate the entity (in whole or in
part) that is more restrictive than the limitations that would apply under the State
law generally applicable to the entity in the absence of the restriction" (emphasis
added).
112. See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
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drafted to further larger business policy concerns."'
Ironically, the source of a restriction, in the statute or a
contract, on the ability to transfer or liquidate an ownership
interest in a business organization probably fails to distinguish
between gifts and bequests that deserve discounted values from
those that should be taxed at the full fair market value. Because
LLC statutory dissociation rights can easily be eliminated by the
operating agreement, arguably a state law imposed restricted
interest carries no more assurance of being a bona fide restric-
tion than a contractually based restriction. In both instances the
real inquiry should focus on whether the recipient has received
shares of stock or interests in a partnership or LLC that truly
cannot be liquidated or disposed of, or if the statutory or con-
tractual restrictions represent shams serving only to provide a
basis to lower the gift or estate tax through discounted
valuation."5
Although Congress' emphasis on the state law statutory
default provisions will do little to further the gift and estate tax
policy, this formalistic distinction will encourage legislators to
eliminate statutory dissociation rights, thus exposing unsophisti-
cated business participants to all of the risks minority share-
holders of close corporations currently face."' In Alabama, this
result has already occurred, and in the years to come the Ala-
bama courts will probably see cases of Alabama LLC minority
members with problems similar to those experienced by close
corporation shareholders. Although the Alabama LLC statute
has no statutory remedies for oppressed minority LLC members,
the Alabama courts should, by analogy, allow these LLC mem-
114. See supra notes 5, 106-107 and accompanying text.
115. See generally Mezzullo, supra note 107, at 107 (arguing that reliance on the
restriction provided by state law not good if transferor or a family member of trans-
feror is able to remove restriction immediately after transfer); Matthew McGuire,
Note, The Uncertain Future of the Limited Partnership in Estate Planning, 10 CONN.
PROB. L.J. 337, 365 (1996) (stating that Congress is likely to eventually take away
§ 2704(b) statutory restriction exception); William E. Sider, Partnership Taxa-
tion-What's Hot and What's Not, 74 MICH. B.J. 1034, 1038-39 (1995) (arguing that
certain states' statutory defaults have not yet been tested to determine whether they
qualify for maximum valuation discounts by eliminating the impact of § 2704(b);
IRSCongress will probably issue future rules to curb the growing use of vehicles
such as the LLC to obtain valuation discounts).
116. See supra notes 62-63.
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bers to invoke the current statutory oppression remedy available
to corporate shareholders.117 Moreover, Alabama LLC members
victimized by squeeze-out techniques should also be able to in-
voke the common law tort of oppression remedies developed by
the Alabama courts for close corporation shareholders."1
IV. CONCLUSION
Long before the LLC rose into prominence, partnership and
close corporation law struggled with issues concerning the indi-
vidual owners' rights to withdraw their capital from the busi-
ness. By statutorily granting each partner the power to with-
draw from the partnership, the partnership model favors the
rights of the individual partners over the rest of partners. The
corporate model, providing no statutory redemption rights thus
requiring the shareholders to contractually bargain for a buy-sell
agreement, favors the rights of the shareholders as a group over
the rights of the individual shareholder. For solely tax reasons,
until late 1996 the LLC statutory provisions had to provide the
members the power to withdraw and trigger a possible dissolu-
tion of the company. After the Internal Revenue Service elimi-
nated the partnership classification regulations by automatically
taxing all LLCs as partnerships, LLCs for the first time pos-
sessed the freedom to adopt business provisions addressing dis-
sociation without regard to the partnership classification regula-
tions.
When analyzing only the business policy concerns, the LLC
statute should eliminate the individual member's power to dis-
solve the LLC but retain rights to dissociate with redemption
rights from the company. Although strong arguments can be
made that statutory dissociation rights increase transaction
costs for more sophisticated LLC business participants, these
rights should nevertheless remain in the statute in order to help
prevent the squeeze-out techniques so commonly experienced by
minority shareholders of close corporations. Unsophisticated
business participants that will not seek adequat legal advice
before proceeding are especially vulnerable to oppressive behav-
117. See supra notes 66-68, 74-76.
118. See supra notes 69-73.
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ior by the majority owners. Statutory dissociation rights will
provide such members with enough bargaining power that
should encourage the parties to settle rather than resort to liti-
gation.
Although the debate addressing whether the corporate or
partnership dissociation model offers superior statutory defaults
is interesting and leaves a great deal of room for disagreement,
it appears that another set of tax rules has replaced the partner-
ship classification regulations as the driving force behind LLC
legislation addressing dissociation rights. Because the gift and
estate rules deny all opportunities to discount the value of LLC
interests transferred by gift or bequest between family members
if the statute allows dissociation rights, state legislatures, like
Alabama's, will be strongly motivated to eliminate the dissocia-
tion rights for that reason alone, without carefully considering
the business consequences. Thus, a large number of LLC mem-
bers not engaged in estate and gift tax planning will become
vulnerable to the close corporation squeeze-out tactics and will
further crowd the courts seeking the equitable and statutory
relief now available to close corporation shareholders.
Moreover, the elimination of dissociation rights in the state
law statutory default provisions does little to distinguish those
gifts and bequests that deserve discounted valuation from those
that deserve to be taxed at full fair market value. Regardless
how the state statute resolves the dissociation rights question in
the default provision, the parties' operating agreement still pro-
vides the last word. In otherwords the operating agreement of a
LLC in a state with statutory dissociation rights can eliminate
those rights rendering that LLC indistinguishable from a LLC in
a different state that contains no dissociation rights in the stat-
ute. Conversely, the operating agreement of a LLC in a state
with no dissociation rights can provide for such rights in a buy-
sell agreement.
As long as the gift and estate tax valuation rules artificially
focus on the state law statutory default provision as the iron-
clad dividing line separating LLC interests that can and cannot
qualify for discounted valuation, the trend to eliminate all disso-
ciation rights in the LLC statutes will continue. Only Congress
can stop this trend and allow the states to draft LLC dissocia-
tion rules for business policy reasons. Congress should re-exam-
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ine the gift and estate tax valuation rules and move the empha-
sis away from the state law statutory default provisions address-
ing dissociation.
